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Case No. 20110354 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 1 > ;ANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, 
BANK OF AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, K MART CORPORATION, 
a Michigan corporation, and NEW ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) relies on the statement of facts 
contained in its principal brief However, UDOT takes issue with Kmart Corporation's 
representation that it "owned an access easement granted by FPA's predecessor pursuant 
to a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions and Grant of Easements dated October 1, 
1980 (the 'Declaration')." Kmart Rsp. Brief at 4,1j 2. As UDOT explained in the trial 
court, "[t]he Declaration does not grant K Mart any ownership interest in the subject 
property. At most, the Declaration gives K Mart a 'mutual, nonexclusive, and reciprocal 
easement and right-of-way for passage over and use of the Common Areas of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shopping center owned by FPA West Point, LLC." R. 74. K Mart's sole interest in the 
condemned property is as a former lessee of FPA West Point (FPA), the fee owner. 
UDOT objects to the balance of Kmart's statement of facts as irrelevant. As 
Kmart concedes, "[t]he Condemnation Action remains in its early stages. FPA has not yet 
answered the Complaint. The parties have not made their initial disclosures, have not had 
an initial planning meeting, have not conducted discovery, and have not designated 
experts." Kmart Rsp. Brief at 4. Consequently, the record contains no findings as to the 
legal effect of the condemnation on Kmart or the validity of the appraisal methodology, 
and neither bears on the sole issue for decision: whether UDOT is obligated to provide 
separate appraisals and separate valuation proceedings for each claimant of an interest in 
condemned property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS RULING THAT EACH 
INTEREST HOLDER IS ENTITLED TO SEPARATE VALUATION 
PROCEEDINGS IN CONDEMNED PROPERTY, REGARDLESS OF ITS 
VALUE IN GROSS, IS THE SOLE ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs petition for interlocutory appeal presented a single question: "Does 
Utah law require UDOT, when condemning a single parcel of property, to provide a 
separate appraisal and separate valuation proceedings to each claimant of an interest in 
the property without regard to whether the sum of the interests exceeds the value of the 
property as a whole?" Petition at 4. The district court, contrary to this Court's holding in 
State ex rel Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975), decided that issue 
2 
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against plaintiff and ordered "separate determinations of the just compensation due to 
FPA and to Kmart for injury to their respective interests in the subject property." R, 196. 
No defendant filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal or raised any additional issue. 
Nonetheless, defendant FPA West Point, LLC (FPA) devotes its entire response brief to a 
completely different issue: the inclusion of severance damages in the calculation of the 
property's fair market value, not the apportionment of damages among the interest 
holders. This issue played no part in the district court's memorandum decision from 
which the interlocutory appeal was taken. In fact, the district court has not yet entertained 
any challenge to the value of the property as appraised by UDOT. Consequently, FPA's 
brief has no bearing on the question properly before the Court. "On interlocutory appeal, 
we review only those specific issues presented in the petition." Houghton v. Dep't of 
Health, 2005 UT 63, ^ 16, 125 P.3d 860; see also State v. Coble, 2010 UT App 98, % 10, 
232 P.3d 538 (rejecting consideration of arguments "not . . . properly before us because 
Coble failed to bring them either by way of a cross-appeal or by separate petition for 
interlocutory appeal"). 
FPA's reliance on Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 
2011 UT 62, 2011 WL 5110962, _ P.3d , is telling. The opinion in that case was 
filed on October 18, 2011-nearly nine months after the trial court entered the 
memorandum decision challenged here. Moreover, the issue in Admiral Beverage has 
nothing to do with the apportionment of damages among multiple interest holders in 
3 
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condemned property; instead, it deals exclusively with the elements of severance 
damages. FPA's discussion of that issue in the context of this interlocutory appeal is, at 
best, premature, and appears to be nothing more than an attempt to obtain an advisory 
opinion on a topic it has not yet broached with the trial court. Because the determination 
of the property's fair market value belongs, in the first instance, to the trial court- based 
on evidence to be presented in proceedings not yet held-FPA's argument on severance 
damages is irrelevant to the issue in the present appeal and should be disregarded.1 
FPA's response brief concludes with a one-page argument contending that 
Brown's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 violates the just compensation 
provision of the Utah Constitution. In support of this contention, FPA states that in 
paragraph 28 of Admiral Beverage, "this court explained why Section 78B-6-511 would 
violate Article I, Section 22 if Brown was correct about the statute's meaning and effect, 
and the Court should construe Section 78B-6-511 in a way that does not violate the Utah 
Constitution." FPA Rsp. Brief at 26. However, scrutiny of'the Admiral Beverage opinion 
reveals no mention of Brown, and only two of the opinion's 44 paragraphs refer to section 
78B-6-511. See 2011 UT 62 at ffif 32-33. Those references relate solely to the calculation 
of severance damages and have no bearing on the principle at stake in this interlocutory 
appeal: the apportionment of damages among interest holders. Like the issue of 
*In addition, a petition for rehearing was filed in Admiral Beverage on November 
30, 2011, and this Court ordered a response to the petition on January 3, 2012. Therefore, 
the scope of the decision in that case remains unclear. 
4 
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severance damages, this issue was not raised in plaintiffs petition for interlocutory 
appeal, and defendants filed no cross-appeal or independent petition raising it. Finally, 
FPA has failed to identify any record citation showing that it raised this issue in the trial 
court. For these reasons, FPA's argument that section 78B-6-511 is unconstitutional 
warrants no consideration. 
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT REQUIRE SEPARATE 
APPRAISALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR EACH INTEREST HOLDER 
Defendants urged the trial court to bifurcate condemnation proceedings as to FPA 
and K Mart: "to say that the trials and the mediation should be conducted separately, just 
as the statute requires." R. 313 at 11:23-24. As FPA's counsel explained, "FPA doesn't 
think it's required under the statute to share anything with K-Mart. So that's what led to 
the motion." R. 313 at 13:5-7. But as UDOT's attorney pointed out in the hearing, 
defendants' position arose from a misperception of the condemnation statutes and the 
scope of their applicability. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507(2) (West 2009), "[a]ll 
parcels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included in the 
same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate 
or separate them to suit the convenience of the parties." This statute applies, by its own 
terms, only where multiple parcels are being condemned in the same action-the 
circumstances present in Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933), 
which defendants argue should control here. But in the present case, UDOT is 
5 
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condemning only a single access point to a single parcel under single ownership. 
Therefore, section 507 has no applicability. 
Section 511, in contrast, speaks generally to valuation proceedings. As a part of 
determining the property's fair market value, section 511 directs the finder of fact to 
determine "the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property[.]" Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-51 l(l)(b) (West 2009). While subsection (l)(c) further clarifies that 
where multiple parcels are involved, the factfinder must separately assess the value of 
each interest in each parcel, nothing in section 511 generically permits separate 
proceedings; in fact, the statute talks in terms of a single court, jury, or referee. That 
section 507 gives the court discretion to consolidate or separate proceedings specifically 
with respect to multiple parcels shows that the legislature knew how to permit separate 
adjudication in that unique circumstance; that section 511 contains no similar provision 
indicates that the legislature did not intend to allow separate proceedings where a single 
parcel is involved. Section 511 provides no statutory basis for the separate proceedings 
defendants seek. As UDOT's counsel summarized to the trial court, "jTjhe defendant in 
this case has confused parcels of land with interests in property." R. 313 at 17:23-25. 
Contrary to K Mart's representation, UDOT does not deny that section 51 l(l)(b) 
obligates the factfinder to determine and assess the value of each interest in the property 
condemned. That determination is the purpose and function of the evidentiary 
proceedings before the trial court, which have yet to take place. Nor does UDOT deny 
6 
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that each interest must be taken into consideration in establishing the condemned 
property's fair market value. Addressing the distinction between separate proceedings 
and separate valuation, UDOT's trial attorney explained, 
The reason I'm suggesting that there is no conflict [between Brown 
and Town of Perry], your Honor, is because FPA is entitled to have their 
interest separately valued, just by the same jury. The case goes to trial, the 
jury determines, as 78[B]-6-511 says it should, the Court and the jury 
determines the value of the property sought to be condemned, and the value 
of each and every separate estate or interest in the property. 
Doesn't say separate trials, separate juries. The jury determines that. 
So FPA will get its separate valuation. It's just not entitled to do it in a 
completely separate trial. There are lots of trials where one defendant 
wants a jury and another defendant doesn't. My understanding has always 
been once a jury is requested, that's the controlling decision. Doesn't mean 
that the parties who don't want a jury go off and have their own separate 
trial. That would be a waste of judicial resources, certainly. 
R. 313 at 18:15 -19:5. 
Having the condemned property's fair market value determined in a single 
proceeding does not prejudice the defendants. If the fee owner of the property, FPA, 
were to sell clear title to the property on the open market, it would have to establish the 
property's selling price by taking into consideration, as a cost of sale, each estate and 
interest that would have a claim against FPA for any injury caused to those interests by 
the sale. FPA would, in effect, have to apportion its sale proceeds among affected 
interest holders in order to deliver clear title to the buyer. The value of the property, as 
reflected in its selling price, would comprehend those costs. 
7 
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A condemnation action is no different in this respect. When UDOT seeks to 
acquire a parcel (in whole or in part) under single ownership, it can negotiate a price with 
the fee owner. But where the parties cannot agree on a fair market value, the trial court 
acts in the role of the fee owner to determine, in light of all the separate estates and 
interests, what the property is worth. The court must then apportion that value among the 
interest holders, just as a seller on the open market would have to compensate them from 
the proceeds of the sale. Because the value of the property comprehends the value of 
each subsidiary interest, it is neither remarkable nor unfair to apportion that value among 
the interest holders. 
Requiring the condemnation damages to be ascertained in a single action serves 
important policy considerations. Where private property is taken for public purposes, 
those purposes are best served by timeliness, certainty, finality, and fiscal responsibility in 
the condemnation process. As set forth in the affidavit of Lyle McMillan, Director of 
UDOT's Right-of-Way and Property Management Division, UDOT currently has over 60 
pending condemnation actions involving over 600 independent interests. R. 219. If 
UDOT were required to obtain a separate appraisal and conduct a separate course of 
litigation for each interest holder, public works projects would be unduly delayed and 
their cost would be dramatically increased. In 2010, the average cost of an appraisal to 
UDOT was $2,200, and individual appraisals can cost in excess of $5,000. R. 219. 
Requiring an individual appraisal for each interest holder would multiply the total cost of 
8 
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appraisals unnecessarily. Litigating similar factual issues with each separate interest 
holder would waste both judicial and UDOT resources and thwart UDOT's ability to 
move forward in a timely manner to complete needed public works. And, because 
separate actions would require separate factfinders, there is a risk of inconsistency in the 
valuation methodologies they may apply and the verdicts they may render, potentially 
exposing UDOT to aggregate judgments in excess of the property's fair market value. 
Worst, none of these additional burdens on the condemning authority would increase an 
interest holder's opportunity to produce evidence relevant to the value of its interest-an 
opportunity already protected by section 78B-6-51 l(l)(b). 
III. BROJm CORRECT!^ STATUTORY STANDARD 
FOR DETERMINING DAMAGES INVOLVING A SINGLE PARCEL 
OF CONDEMNED PROPERTY 
Brown is consistent with the requirements of section 511. In Brown, the court was 
faced with an action to condemn land owned by the Browns and leased, in part, to 
Southland Corporation for a 7-Eleven store. The condemnation award to Southland 
included severance damages for fixtures, personal property, and the cost of removing 
personal property. The State Road Commission appealed. The opinion does not specify 
the issues on appeal, but the court appears to have given plenary consideration to the 
damages awarded to Southland. It began by reviewing the substantive law applicable to 
condemnations, stating the general rule: "The condemning authority is liable for the 
value of the land taken and for severance damages to the land not taken, and it is from 
9 
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these amounts that the lessee must receive any damages which it may have sustained as a 
result of the taking." 531 P.2d at 1295. It then detailed the trial court's instructions to the 
jury regarding damages: 
By its instructions the trial court told the jury to award compensation to 
Southland Corporation for the difference between the market value of the 
unexpired term of the lease and the present value of the rents required to be 
paid under the lease and then told the jurors to award as severance damages 
in addition thereto the value of personal property in the store which became 
obsolete by reason of the taking. 
Id. at 1296. Only after tacitly acknowledging the correctness of the general rule did the 
Court conclude that the award of severance damages for personal property was reversible 
error. It affirmed the principle that the damages to the lessee must come from the 
property's reasonable value.2 The Court stated that "since the condemning authority takes 
the interest of both the landowner and of the lessee, it does not matter to it which of those 
two parties has the better bargain." Id. It further explained: 
So far as the condemning authority is concerned, the agreement 
between the tenant and landlord is not important. Whether the tenant gets 
much or little will depend upon whether his lease agreement is 
advantageous or disadvantageous to him. If the tenant gets much, the 
landowner gets less, and if the tenant gets little, then the landlord gets more. 
Id. In either case, the condemning authority has justly compensated for the property 
taken. The constitution requires no more. 
2Because it was apparently reviewing the correctness of the entire award to 7-
Eleven, the Court's statements regarding the apportionment of damages, contrary to 
Kmart's characterization, are not dicta, but are a necessary predicate to the Court's final 
decision. See Kmart Rsp. Brief at 17-18. 
10 
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Defendants fail to understand that section 5 M's subsections contemplate a unitary 
process in which a single finder of fact considers each interest in each condemned parcel 
in order to reach a fair market value for the property as a whole. Both Kmart and FPA, as 
well as any other interest holder in the property, are entitled to present evidence of their 
interest for inclusion in that value. But once the total value is determined, it is the 
factfinder's burden, not UDOT's, to apportion that total value among the interest holders 
on the basis of the evidence submitted at trial. Brown fully comports with that 
methodology.3 
Kmart's invocation of Admiral Beverage is also unconvincing. Unlike Admiral 
Beverage Corporation, which owned the property in question, Kmart is not an owner of 
the property condemned in the present action. Consequently, its damages are properly 
3In discussing subsection (2) of section 511-which is not properly before the 
Court-FPA cites Idaho ex rel Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976), as 
supporting its argument against apportionment of damages. See FPA Rsp. Brief at 12. 
Bastian, in fact, upholds the same methodology applied in Brown: 
It was the State's theory of the case at trial and is its theory on appeal 
that the compensation for the value of the land taken and the damages to the 
remaining property by reason of severance should be assessed in total and 
only thereafter should that total award be apportioned between the lessor 
Bastian and the lessee Albertson's. The State sought a jury instruction to 
the effect, but it was denied. The denial of that instruction was error. The 
mere fact that ownership of land is divided among different persons and of 
owners of various interests in the title including leasehold does not in and of 
itself enhance the value of the property. 
546 P.2d at 403 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
11 
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assessed as a part of the compensation due to the property owner-here, FPA. Nothing in 
Admiral Beverage holds otherwise.4 
The cases Kmart cites to show that leases and easements are protectable property 
interests for purposes of condemnation are distinguishable. See Kmart Rsp. Brief at 13 
n.2. In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), Colman sought 
inverse condemnation damages when the state enacted legislation to breach a causeway 
on the Great Salt Lake for flood control purposes. Colman operated and maintained a 
brine canal for extraction of minerals from deep lake brines on state-owned land under a 
state-authorized lease and easement. The Court held that Colman's property interest 
could not be taken without just compensation absent an emergency exception, and 
remanded the case for further factfinding. But in Colman, the underlying property was 
owned by and directly leased from the state. The state thus stood in the same position to 
Colman as FPA stands to Kmart: owner to lessee. Colman does not stand for the 
proposition that a state condemnor must separately compensate the lessee of a private 
property owner when taking the owner's property for public use. Wasatch Gas Company 
v. Bouwhuis, 82 Utah 573, 26 P.2d 548 (1933), is equally inapposite. Contrary to Kmart's 
implication, in Bouwhuis, the gas company did not condemn a privately held easement for 
public use, but condemned a strip of private land to create an easement "to construct, lay, 
4Moreover, as observed in n.l, supra, a petition for rehearing is pending in Admiral 
Beverage, casting the scope of its holding in doubt. 
12 
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operate, maintain, and repair" a pipeline. 26 P.2d at 549. Neither case requires a 
condemnor to independently compensate a lessee or easement holder whose interest is 
subsidiary to a private landowner. 
In short, Brown correctly applies the calculation of condemnation damages as 
articulated in section 78B-6-511. It allows for all interest holders to present evidence of 
the value of their respective interests in a single proceeding. The finder of fact in that 
proceeding is charged to reach a fair market value for the condemned property that fairly 
reflects all interests and to apportion that figure among the interest holders. Neither the 
statute nor applicable precedent permits subsidiary interests in a single parcel to demand 
separate appraisals and separate proceedings. If it did, a condemning authority could be 
required to pay many times the value of property it obtains but once. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained fully above, the Utah Department of Transportation 
respectfully moves the Court to reverse the decision of the trial court ordering separate 
determinations of the just compensation due to FPA and to Kmart for injury to their 
respective interests in the condemned property. 
DATED this ffllv day of January, 2012. 
/£., UL 
Nancy L.Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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